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GOV. ROOSEVELT'S "EXACT PARALLELS." 



BY EDWIN D. MEAD. 



Gov. Roosevelt's letter of acceptance 
is mainly devoted to the discussion of 
imperialism. "He presents here," says 
one of his leading supporters, " an argu- 
ment based upon the history of the for- 
mer expansions of the country, which, 
although not absolutely novel, has not 
been elaborated before with so much 
force and cleverness. His own exten- 
sive studies in American history make 
him at home here." If Mr. Roosevelt is 
at home in American history, and espe- 
cially in the history of the Louisiana pur- 
chase, which is the chapter of history 
which he chiefly discusses, he has con- 
cealed the fact in his letter with a clever- 
ness which is certainly conspicuous. 
He says : — 

The parallel between what Jefferson did with 
Louisiana and what is now being done in the 
Philippines is exact. He intended that ulti- 
mately self-government should be introduced 
throughout the territory, but only as the different 
parts became fit for it, and no sooner. . . . 
Years elapsed before the Louisianians were 
given self-government, Jefferson appointing the 
governor and other officials without any con- 
sultation with the inhabitants of the newly ac- 
quired territory. . . . The great majority of 
the inhabitants, white and colored alike, were 
bitterly opposed to the transfer. An armed 
force of United States soldiers had to be hastily 
sent into the territory to prevent insurrection, 
President Jefferson sending these troops to 
Louisiana for exactly the same reasons and with 
exactly the same purpose that President Mc- 
Kinley has sent troops to the Philippines. . . . 
As soon as the present revolt in the I'hilippines 
is put down and order established, it will un- 
doubtedly be possible to give the islands a lar- 
ger measure of self-government than Jefferson 
originally gave Louisiana. 

These are Mr. Roosevelt's six points. 
Every historical scholar surely knows that 
every one of them is utterly misleading 
and most of them false. Mr. Roosevelt 
knows it. I say it to his praise ; for his 
credit as a scholar is more important 



than his fame in melodrama. A histori- 
cal scholar Mr. Roosevelt is ; and if I 
were sure that readers would turn to his 
own chapter upon the purchase of Louis- 
iana, in his work upon "The Winning 
of the West," where he has treated the 
subject as a historian, instead of as a 
reckless partisan, I would gladly stop 
here, — for I should much prefer to let 
him refute himself. There is no better 
account of the Louisiana purchase and 
the events following it than that there 
given by Mr. Roosevelt, save only the 
account by Henry Adams in his his- 
tory of Jefferson's administration ; and 
the account makes shipwreck of the 
impression given in his letter of accept- 
ance, besides emphasizing in a more 
striking and powerful manner than any 
other account whatever the point of 
most fundamental importance in the 
whole matter, upon wliich point his let- 
ter of acceptance is absolutely silent. 

The parallel between our relations to 
Louisiana and our relations to the Philip- 
pines fails at every point of controversy 
or of significance. A condition of the 
cession of Louisiana was the distinct pro- 
vision that the inhabitants "shall be in- 
corporated in the Union of the United 
States" and in due course admitted to 
statehood. A regular territorial govern- 
ment with an elective Legislature and a 
delegate to Congress was given the por- 
tion of Louisiana which contained almost 
the entire French and Spanish population 
of the territory, March 2, 1805, less than 
fifteen months after we took possession, 
with clear understanding that statehood 
was to follow in a few years, as it did. 
There was no such degree of disaffection 
of the people to tiie change as Mr. 
Roosevelt intimates. There was no 
danger at any time of insurrection 



t-^^^* 



against the United States government, 
springing from such disaffection, and no 
hasty sending of troops to Louisiana 
"for exactly the same reasons that Presi- 
dent McKinley has sent troops to the 
PhiUppines," — nothing whatever that 
can truthfully be so described. The 
Spanish minister at Washington, four 



ment of all the advantages and immuni- 
ties of citizens of the United States." 
Does Mr. Roosevelt find an "exact par- 
allel " to this in the treaty of Paris, by 
which the Philippines were ceded to the 
United States ? Did Laussat blue pen- 
cil this article, in acquainting the people 
of Louisiana with the provisions of the 



onths after the purchase, protested treaty, in his proclamation ? It was the 



against it, declaring that we had bought 
stolen goods and that Spain was the 
rightful owner; and his protests were so 
energetic that Jefferson sent a strong 
body of troops to Natchez. " The gov- 
ernment of Spain," he wrote, "has pro- 
tested against the right of France to 
transfer, and it is possible she may re- 
fuse possession, and that may bring on 
acts of force." Some of the militia thus 
assembled, together with a volunteer 
company of horse, accompanied Wilkin- 
son and Claiborne to New Orleans, as 
an escort, to take possession and to gar- 
rison the forts, from which the Spanish 
garrisons were being withdrawn ; but this 
was with no thought of a popular insur- 
rection. Jefferson sent his troops to 
Louisiana not to subject the people of 
the territory, but to meet the threats of 
the government of Spain. 

"As soon as the present revolt in 
the Philippines is put down," says Mr. 
Roosevelt, " it will undoubtedly be pos- 
sible to give the islands a larger meas- 
ure of self-government than Jefferson 
originally gave Louisiana." Here is the 
disingenuousness of the partisan. By 
"originally" Mr. Roosevelt means sim- 
ply the provisional government -given 
Louisiana immediately, pending the or- 
ganization of a regular territorial gov- 
ernment ; he says nothing of any farther 
hope or promise, and is silent, in draw- 
ing his "exact parallel," about the great 
pledge and recognized ultimate obliga- 
tion, in the light of which every early 
and provisional act in Louisiana was 
to be interfireted. The third article of 
the treaty of cession provided that " the 
inhabitants of the ceded territory shall 
be incorporated into the Union of the 
United States, and admitted as soon as 
possible, according to the principles of 
the federal constitution, to the enjoy- .repeating the declaration of the treaty, 

ly J;.. '06 



article to which he directed special at- 
tention, the one thing in his proclama- 
tion which he printed in italics; and he 
added : — 

Thus are you, Louisianians, suddenly invested 
with the rights and privileges appertaining to a 
free constitution and government, secured and 
guaranteed by the force of arms, cemented by 
treaties, and tested by time and experience. 
You will be incorporated with a nation already 
numerous and powerful, renowned besides for 
its industry, its patriotism, and the degree of 
civilization and knowledge it possesses, and 
which by its rapid progress seems destined to 
the most brilliant rank that a people ever en- 
joyed on the face of the earth. By the nature 
of the government of the United States, and of 
the privileges upon the enjoyment of which you 
immediately enter, vou will have, even under a 
provisional government, popular rulers, whose 
acts you will be at liberty to censure or to pro- 
test against with impunity, and who will be per- 
manently in need of your esteem, your suffrages, 
and your affection. The public affairs and in- 
terests, far from being interdicted to your con- 
sideration, will be your own affairs and interests, 
on which the opinions of wise and impartial men 
will be sure to exercise, in the long run, a pre- 
ponderating influence, and to which you could 
not even remain indifferent without exposing 
yourselves to bitter repentance. The time will 
soon come when you will establish for yourselves 
a form of government which, although respect- 
ing the sacred jirinciples consecrated in the 
social pact of the federal union, will be adapted 
to your manners, your usages, your climate, 
your soil, and your peculiar localities. 

Does Mr. Roosevelt find an "exact 
parallel " between this proclamation and 
that of President McKinley in the Phil- 
ippines, in December, 1898, even after 
General Otis had done his utmost edi- 
torial work upon h? Does he find any 
parallel in any address to the people of 
the Philippines by General Otis, or 
President Schurman, or Judge Taft, to 
the address by Commissioner Claiborne 
upon taking possession of Louisiana in 
the name of the United States, in which, 



he assured the people that "the United 
States received them as brothers, and 
would hasten to extend to them a par- 
ticipation in the invaluable rights form- 
ing the basis of their own unexampled 

>_ prosperity?" Does he find the account 

^ ^ of any ceremony in Manila parallel to 

L_ J that by which, in the presence of Laus- 

•^ sat, the French prefect, and Claiborne, 

^ the right of the people to choice of 

/^ allegiance was recognized? 

Whether the transfer of sovereignty in 
Louisiana from France to the United 
States was the occasion of violence to 
many tender ties may be judged from 
the fact that the French domination had 
lasted just twenty days, after a Spanish 
government of thirty-four years. The 
news of the annexation to France had 
been welcomed at New Orleans with 
general rejoicing, as was natural, for the 
city was more French than Spanish ; but 
the representative citizens hastened to 
assure Laussat that they had " no cause 
of complaint against the Spanish govern- 
ment." Both Spanish and French would, 
doubtless, for the most part, have pre- 
ferred French sovereignty to American ; 
but resistance to the transfer of the 
province there was none, and there was 
largely indifference. Mr. Roosevelt as- 
sured us four years ago that the French 
at New Orleans accepted their rapidly 
changing fates "with something very 
much like apathy," their joy^ at cession 
to France being " tepid," and their feel- 
ing toward us being that of " a puzzled 
distrust." The chief thing at which they 
murmured afterward was our prohibi- 
tion of the importation of slaves into 
Louisiana. Mr. Roosevelt was uncer- 
tain, four years ago, whether their mur- 
murings "did or did not comport with 
entire loyalty to the United States gov- 
ernment." He is probably not uncer- 
tain today as to the feeling we have 
earned from the people of Luzon, and 
whether that feeling is expressed in 
something plainer than murmurings. 

When Laussat received notice of the 
cession to the United States, he at once 
gathered, he tells us, " what Louisiana 
possesses of most respectable and dis- 
tinguished, within thirty miles, in point 



of reputation, virtue, talent, influence, 
and wealth," explained to tiiem the sit- 
uation and asked their co-operation, 
which was courteously promised. The 
Spanish commissioner, recognizing the 
interchanges as mere formalities, offered 
the services of their own troops to the 
French until the arrival of the Ameri- 
cans. " From the moment of the ces- 
sion," Laussat wrote, " Casa Calvo (the 
Spanish governor) has behaved toward 
me with exquisite politeness." So far 
from the time of these mutations being 
a lugubrious time, it was a time of mutual 
festivities and big dinners. A large 
number of young Frenchmen, sons of 
the best families, joined the volunteer 
battalion organized by the American 
consul to police the city until the arrival 
of the American commissioners, and 
the historian says: "The French, by 
their zeal, vigilance and patriotism 
during their time of service, proved 
themselves worthy of American citizen- 
ship." 

The Frenchmen did not love us; why 
should they? They were silent enough 
when their flag went down and ours went 
up — and we do not think the worse of 
them for that. But they did not regard 
it as any blow or menace to their polit- 
ical aspirations; there was no parallel 
whatever to the feeling which drove the 
people of Luzon to war. The Spanish 
royalists hated us and our republican- 
ism ; a few sisters of charity thought the 
world was coming to an end ; but the 
mass of the people accepted the change 
with complacency, as they had accepted 
five other similar changes which had oc- 
curred within the lifetime of men then 
living. The Spanish officers stayed in 
New Orleans for a year, making mis- 
chief; presently Aaron Burr came, try- 
ing to foment treason there as in other 
places in the Southwest, inside and out- 
side of Louisiana ; and the city was full 
of filibusters — largely, it must be con- 
fessed, Americans — plotting against 
Mexico. Wiiat trouble there was in 
Louisiana sprang from these three 
sources ; any popular uprising or oppo- 
sition, from any class of the people, 
offering any analogy whatever to the 



resentment and resistance in Luzon, 
never appeared and never impended. 
The people certainly had grievances 
enough ; and if they had made more 
protest than they did, it would not have 
been to their discredit. Most violent 
things were said about them in Congress 
— some of the worst by Massachusetts 
men. Our two commissioners, sent to 
organize them, were as unsuitable and 
offensive as President Schurman and 
Judge Taft have been intelligent and 
courteous. Here Mr. Roosevelt's par- 
allel fails again, — and for once to our 
credit. Schurman and Taft have been 
good men in bad business ; Claiborne 
and Wilkinson were bad men in good 
business. What trouble there was in 
New Orleans sprang not from bad poli- 
tics, but from bad manners. It was the 
arrogance and vulgarity of the .Ameri- 
cans, contrasting so rudely with the 
civility and refinement of Laussat, that 
exasperated the better people of New 
Orleans. Major Stoddard, the governor 
sent to St. Louis, was a gentleman ; and 
" in all the changes there," the historian 
of St. Louis tells us, ''■ the public peace, 
or course of business or amusement, was 
not checked or disturbed; on the con- 
trary, the kindest and most hospitable 
feeling everywhere manifested itself." 
The abuses which ensued at New 
Orleans would have been rectified im- 
mediately if it had not taken months to 
exchange communications with Wash- 
ington, instead of a few hours, as in the 
case of Manila. The provisional gov- 
ernment was limited by law to one year; 
but in deference to the remonstrances 
from New Orleans, regular territorial 
government was instituted even before 
that term expired, with the promise of 
statehood to Louisiana as soon as her 
population reached" 60,000, the number 
fixed for statehood in connectioiT with 
the Northwest territory. As a matter of 
fact, Louisiana was admitted to statehood 
before either Indiana or Illinois; and 
two other states, Missouri and Arkansas, 
were constituted from the Louisiana pur- 
chase, while Michigan and Wisconsin of 
the old Northwest territory still waited 
for statehood. Our promise to treat the 



Louisiana territory according to our reg- 
ular principles in dealing with our other 
territory was faithfully and absolutely 
kept. 

This is the sum and substance of the 
politics of the Louisiana question. What 
was the common sense of it .-• The Louis- 
iana purchase, which doubled the area 
of the United States, comprised almost 
a million square miles, almost the en- 
tire region between the Mississippi river 
and the Rocky mountains north of Texas. 
The dozen states created from it have 
now a population of perhaps fifteen mil- 
lions ; but in 1803 it was practically un- 
inhabited. Roving over the whole terri- 
tory were perhaps 30,000 Indians. The 
total negro and white population was 
not twice that number ; and the Louis- 
iana question really resolved itself into 
the question of the few thousand French 
and Spaniards in and about the city of 
New Orleans. The white population of 
the territory was already largely Ameri- 
can. In upper Louisiana, the St. Louis 
region, there were at the time of the ces- 
sion, 5,000 Americans, against 3,760 
French and Spanish together. In the 
Baton Rouge district the Americans 
were " in a great majority ; " and in 
other districts "a considerable part," 
says the official report, were" American. 
There were doubtless more Americans 
than Spanish ; and in ten years, even if 
there had been no cession, there would 
have been more Americans than Span- 
ish and French together — for our peo- 
ple were everywhere pushing into the 
territory, whose rivers were their great 
highways of trade. It is not at all im- 
probable, in view of all the facts and 
clear tendencies, that could a popular 
vote have been held upon the cession in 
1803, it would have approved it ; it cer- 
tainly would have, by the natural Ameri- 
can increase, while men were still won- 
dering whether it would or not. The 
" consent of the governed " — and more 
than that, the urgent demand of the 
governed, as Mr. Roosevelt, the histo- 
rian, so impressively shows — potentially 
existed, and everybody knew it. 

Who were the few thousand French- 
men at New Orleans concernins: whom 



all this pother is about, and what were 
their real feelings toward the country? 
The great work on early Louisiana his- 
tory is that by Charles Gayarre' ; and 
this is what he says, speaking of the gen- 
eration before the cession : — 

Those who came to Louisiana never con- 
sidered that they had found a home in her 
bosom. With the exception, perhaps, of the 
Acadians and of the Germans, whom Law had 
sent to the colony in 1722, those whom she re- 
ceived in her lap were not grateful for the hos- 
pitality, and deemed themselves miserable exiles. 
All the military officers and other persons em- 
ployed by the government had but one object, 
that of obtaining promotion for their services 
here, and of making nionev, by fair or foul 
means, according to their different dispositions, 
in order to return with ampler means of enjoy- 
ment to their cherished native country. With 
regard to the population not composed of offi- 
cials, a good many had been transported to 
Louisiana by force, and detested a country 
which they looked on as a prison. Others had 
been deceived by wild hojjes and exaggerated 
representations of what they were to expect in 
Louisiana. They smarted under the anguish of 
disappointment, and if they labored at all, it was 
to acquire means to get back, — and they even 
impregnated their offspring with these notions. 
Louisiana was a mere place of temporary so- 
journ, nothing better than a caravansary, but no 
home for any one. There were none of those 
associations, not a link of that mystic chain con- 
necting the present with the past and the future, 
which produce an attachment to locality. The 
waters of patriotism had not yet gushed from 
their spring to fertilize the land. 

If this does not exactly describe the 
French sentiment at New Orleans in 
1803, it almost describes it; and it ex- 
actly describes the Spanish sentiment. 
Parallel between this sentiment and the 
patriotism of the Filipino people, their 
love of home, their identification with 
the soil, the devotion which created their 
armies for their struggle for independ- 
ence, there is none. In the one case, a 
few thousand unattached and miscella- 
neous squatters, aU told not equal in 
number to the population of Springfield, 
Mass., rapidly being outnumbered by us 
in natural course, with no desire or 
dream of independence or distinct na- 
tional life; in the other, an immense 
permanent people, with generations of 
association and tradition, intense lovers 
of their country, and the aspiration for 
freedom and independence their master 



passion. This is what the "parallel" 
between the people of New Orleans and 
the people of Alanila comes to. The 
parallel between our subjugating army 
of 70,000 men, who in no possible time 
of peace will ever be followed to Luzon 
by 7,000 American exotics, and the 
American people in their natural rela- 
tions to Louisiana in 1803, can best be 
considered in the description of the 
latter by Mr. Roosevelt, the historian. 
Upon this point, the crucial point in the 
whole matter, Mr. Roosevelt, tlie imperi- 
alist candidate, is silent; but the express 
purpose of Mr. Roosevelt's chapter on 
the purchase of Louisiana, in his history, 
written only four years ago ("The Win- 
ning of the West," vol. iv., p. 258, etc.), 
is precisely to show that there is no 
parallel between "gaining territory by 
armed force and retaining it by treaty " 
and the conditions of our acquisition of 
Louisiana. This is what he says — and 
it is the whole truth of the matter : — 

" In 1802 American settlers were already clus- 
tered here and there on the eastern fringe of 
the vast region whicli then went by the name of 
Louisiana. All the stalwart freemen who had 
made their rude clearings and built their rude 
towns on the hither side of the mighty Mississ- 
ippi were straining with eager desire aj^ainst the 
forces which withheld them from seizing with 
strong hand the coveted province. . . . The 
winning of Louisiana followed inevitably upon 
the great westward thrust of the settler folk. . . 
The navigation of the mouth of the Mississippi 
seemed to them of the first importance. . . . 
Upper Louisiana was owned by the Spaniards 
only in sliadowy fashion, and could not have 
been held by any luiropcan ]iower against the 
sturdy westward pressure of the rifle-bearing 
settlers ; it is improl)able that its fate would 
even have been seriously delayed had it re- 
mained nominally under the control of France 
or Spain. . . . The mouth of the Mississippi 
was held to be of right the projierty of the 
United States. . . . Even Jefferson could see 
that for the Frencli to take Louisiana meant 
war with the United States. ... A faith- 
ful French agent sent a report to Napoleon 
plainly pointing out ti>e impossibility of perma- 
nently holding Louisiana against the Americans. 
He showed that on the western waters alone it 
would be possil>le to gather armies amounting 
in the aggregate to 20,000 or 30,000 men, all of 
them inflamed with the, eager desire to take 
New Orleans." The Sjjaniards left Natchez be- 
cause thev were "fairly drowned out " by the 
American settlers and soldiers ; they now felt 
the same |)ressure upon them in New Orleans. . 
" The surrender of Louisiana" — this was Mr. 



Roosevelt's sensible conclusion — " was due 
primarily to the steady pushing and crowding 
of the frontiersmen. It was not the diplomats 
who decided its destiny, but the settlers of the 
western states. The growth of the teeming 
folk who had crossed the Alleghanies, and were 
building their vigorous commonwealths in the 
northeastern portion of the Mississippi basin 
decided the destiny of all the lands that were 
drained by that mighty river. The steady west- 
ward movement of the Americans was the all- 
important factor in determining the ultimate 
ownership of New Orleans." 

Was it crowding American settlers, 
and not armies and diplomats, who de- 
cided the destiny of Luzon ? Even Mr. 
Roosevelt in 1900 will not press the par- 
allel. In truth, there are no parallels 
which are skin deep. In connection with 
the changes in Louisiana there was, we 
all well know, some personal hardship and 
grief, such as is incident to almost every- 
thing in life ; there was a good deal of 
hyper-theoretics on the one side and the 
other; there was some playing fast and 
loose with obligation ; but these were 
most superficial and temporary things 
— and did not affect for a moment the 
nation's course. We took formal pos- 
session of a territory where we were sure 
to be in an actual majority on the mor- 
row ; we promised the people the same 
treatment given the people in the rest of 
our territory; and we faithfully kept our 
word. That is the whole of the Louis- 
iana story. No, there is one thing 
more ; and for my own part I am very 
glad to add it, in the words of Mr. 
Adams : We proved once for ail " that 
the hopes of humanity lay thenceforward, 
not in attempting to restrain the govern- 
ment from doing whatever the majority 
should think necessary, but in raising 
the people themselves till they should 
think nothing necessary but what was 
good." 

Does Mr. Roosevelt see only an 
" exact parallel " between this chapter 
of our history and the chapter in the 
Philippines, which began with Mr. Mc- 
Kinley's proclamation of December, 
1898 ; no difference between this and 
the procedure by which a great republic 
bought a rotten title to the sovereignty 
over a whole people in the throes of 
revolution, struggling for freedom and 



independence — a people, moreover, who 
had trustingly fought by its side against 
the common enemy — and then, with its 
superior resources supplanting the former 
sovereign, turned to subjugate them to 
its own ends, expressly refusing them 
for any future any pledge of citizenship, 
either through independence or incorpo- 
ration, making them forever men without 
a country ? 

Mr. Roosevelt, in speaking of the atti- 
tude of his opponents on finance, says : 
"They are either insincere or sincere in 
their championship. If insincere, they, 
of course, forfeit all right to belief or 
support on any ground. If sincere, then 
they are a menace to the welfare of the 
country." If Mr. Roosevelt is sincere 
in professing that he can see only an 
exact parallel between Jefferson's atti- 
tude toward Louisiana and McKinley's 
toward the Philippines, then surely never 
was a man more unfit to be intrusted 
with the guidance of a great republic. 

In truth, Mr. Roosevelt knows well 
that Mr. McKinley intends no " ultimate 
self-government" in the Philippines like 
that which was a thing of course to Jef- 
ferson for Louisiana. He knows that 
no sane or sincere man who did intend 
it would fight inveterately any declara- 
tion of that intention — which declara- 
tion would instantly bring peace and 
friendship. He knows what the high 
pledge was which was given to Louisiana 
in advance, while the people of Luzon 
have waited vainly for any pledge what- 
ever as to their ultimate status, such as 
might content them with any fair pro- 
visional government ; and he knows that 
the administration has persistently re- 
fused, and that he would refuse today, 
that pledge, which is the only thing of 
moment when we talk of "parallels." 
He knows that what this election is 
about is to determine whether the Amer- 
ican people will declare, by their indorse- 
ment of Mr. McKinley, that they count 
it safe and right for this republic to do 
this thing. 

I shall not follow Mr. Roosevelt to 
Florida or Texas or New Mexico. All 
tell one story. The Louisiana case is 
the great case, and that on which men 



like to ring the changes. I think that 
I have shown that it has no bearing on 
the case now before the country, nor on 
the whole question of imperialism. The 
very words of the pledge to the people 
of Louisiana became the form in which 
we plighted faith to succeeding acquisi- 
tions. It was not until the taking of the 
Philippines that — it is understood at 
Mr. McKinley's own instance — we re- 
fused any pledge, and declared that we 
reserved it to ourselves to determine the 
civil rights and political status of the 
people of the ceded country. It was 
then that the republican way, on our 
part, was supplanted by the imperial 



way, and tiiat the parallelism between 
our past and present ceased. 

We have a right therefore to ask that, 
whatever appeals for the present course 
may be valid, the appeal to history cease. 
Appeals to precedent even in behalf of 
good and wise policies are often slavish ; 
tlie false appeal to precedent, to white- 
wash wickedness, is pitiful indeed. It 
may be that we are fated to be the an- 
cestors of generations that can see no 
difference between our course in Louis- 
iana and our course in Luzon ; but let 
us not be so cowardly and impious as to 
plead that we are descendants of such 
men. 



LiBKHKY Uh CUNUKtbb 



013 744 835 fl 



ORGANIZE THE WORLD. 

RANTS ''ETERNAL PEACE: 

CHARLES SUMNER'S MORE EXCEL- 
LENT WAY. 

By Edwin D. Mead. Three Tracts in behalf of 
permanent peace. 3 cents per copy, $1.50 per 
hundred copies, $10 per thousand. Peace Crusade 
Committee^ I Beacon Street, Boston. 



